A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives

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Tác giả: Mark Whitmeyer

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 025.525 Selective dissemination of information (SDI)

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 197132

A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver can mediate--and commit to a garbling of the sender's message--or delegate--commit to a stochastic decision rule as a function of the message--and understanding the statement ``the receiver is better off as a result of an improvement of the sender's information'' to mean that her maximal and minimal equilibrium payoffs (weakly) increase as the sender's signal improves (in a Blackwell sense), we find that if the sender is more informed, the receiver is better off.
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