Risk aversion can promote cooperation

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Tác giả: Jay Armas, Mauricio J del Razo, Wout Merbis, Janusz Meylahn, Soroush Rafiee Rad

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 334.3 Cooperatives

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí

ID: 197515

Comment: 37 pages, 17 figuresCooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma games with an arbitrary number of players by combining reaction networks, methods from quantum mechanics applied to stochastic complex systems, game theory and stochastic simulations of molecular reactions. Using this framework, we propose a novel and robust mechanism for cooperation based on risk aversion that leads to cooperative behaviour in population games. Rather than individuals seeking to maximise payouts in the long run, individuals seek to obtain a minimum set of resources with a given level of confidence and in a limited time span. We show that this mechanism can lead to the emergence of new equilibria in a range of social dilemma games.
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