Managers' Choice of Disclosure Complexity

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Tác giả: Jeremy Bertomeu

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 025.525 Selective dissemination of information (SDI)

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 198045

Aghamolla and Smith (2023) make a significant contribution to enhancing our understanding of how managers choose financial reporting complexity. I outline the key assumptions and implications of the theory, and discuss two empirical implications: (1) a U-shaped relationship between complexity and returns, and (2) a negative association between complexity and investor sophistication. However, the robust equilibrium also implies a counterfactual positive market response to complexity. I develop a simplified approach in which simple disclosures indicate positive surprises, and show that this implies greater investor skepticism toward complexity and a positive association between investor sophistication and complexity. More work is needed to understand complexity as an interaction of reporting and economic transactions, rather than solely as a reporting phenomenon.
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