Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives

• Tác giả: Elshan Garashli, Michael Greinecker, Christoph Kuzmics, Jan-Henrik Steg
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2023
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 198168

Tóm tắt

Comment: 32 pages, 5 figuresFor cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.