Theoretical Foundations of Community Rating by a Private Monopolist Insurer: Framework, Regulation, and Numerical Analysis

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Tác giả: Yann Braouezec, John Cagnol

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 010.1 Bibliography

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 198266

Comment: The key findings haven't undergone any modifications. A handful of typos have been corrected, and the presentation has been enhanced for improved clarityCommunity rating is a policy that mandates uniform premium regardless of the risk factors. In this paper, our focus narrows to the single contract interpretation wherein we establish a theoretical framework for community rating using Stiglitz's (1977) monopoly model in which there is a continuum of agents. We exhibit profitability conditions and show that, under mild regularity conditions, the optimal premium is unique and satisfies the inverse elasticity rule. Our numerical analysis, using realistic parameter values, reveals that under regulation, a 10% increase in indemnity is possible with minimal impact on other variables.
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