Better Foundations for Subjective Probability

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Tác giả: Sven Neth

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 372.79 Elementary education

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

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Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 200814

Comment: Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of PhilosophyHow do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure subjective probability for partly irrational agents.
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