Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Peyman Khezr, Vijay Mohan, Lionel Page

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 018.3 +Catalogs arranged by author, main entry, date, or register number

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 201965

This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP), and generalized second price (GSP)-to determine efficient resource allocation in these settings. Using a Greedy algorithm for allocating objects, we analyze bidding behavior, revenue and efficiency of these three auctions using theory, lab experiments, and AI-enriched simulations. Our results suggest that the uniform-price auction has the highest level of truthful bidding and efficiency while the discriminatory price and the generalized second-price auctions are superior in terms of revenue generation. This study not only deepens the understanding of auction-based approaches to NP-hard problems but also provides practical insights for market design.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH