Third Degree Price Discrimination Under Costly Information Acquisition

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Tác giả: Irfan Tekdir

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 025.525 Selective dissemination of information (SDI)

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 202973

Comment: 25 pages, 5 figuresThis paper investigates third-degree price discrimination under endogenous market segmentation. Segmenting a market requires access to information about consumers, and this information comes with a cost. I explore the trade-offs between the benefits of segmentation and the costs of information acquisition, revealing a non-monotonic relationship between consumer surplus and the cost of information acquisition for monopolist. I show that in some markets, allowing the monopolist easier access to customer data can also benefit customers. I also analyzed how social welfare reacts to changes in the cost level of information acquisition and showed that the non-monotonicity result is also valid in social welfare analysis.
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