Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad

• Tác giả: Jan Knoepfle, Julia Salmi
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 525.63 Earth (Astronomical geography)
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2024
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 203044

Tóm tắt

We analyze the dynamic tradeoff between generating and disclosing evidence. Agents are tempted to delay investing in a new technology in order to learn from information generated by the experiences of others. This informational free-riding is collectively harmful as it slows down learning and innovation adoption. A welfare-maximizing designer can delay the disclosure of previously generated information in order to speed up adoption. The optimal policy transparently discloses bad news and delays good news. This finding resonates with regulation demanding that fatal breakdowns be reported promptly. The designer's intervention makes all agents better off.