Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets

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Tác giả: Laura Doval, Pablo Schenone

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 511.4 Approximations formerly also 513.24 and expansions

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

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ID: 203273

We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent's conjectures. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition--consistency--for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.
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