Collective Upkeep

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Erik Madsen, Eran Shmaya

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 320.53 Collectivism and fascism

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 203278

 We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic in-kind contributions, motivated by incentives problems facing crowd-sourced recommender systems. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by redistributive policies which are infeasible when group members can leave or misreport their preferences. An optimal mechanism reduces contributions for group members with low benefit-cost ratios to encourage participation
  and pairs reduced contributions with restricted access to the good to ensure truthful reporting. At most two membership tiers are offered at the optimum, indicating that ecommerce and digital content platforms may benefit substantially from offering simple user-adjustable recommendation settings.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH