Maximal Social Welfare Relations on Infinite Populations Satisfying Permutation Invariance

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Jeremy Goodman, Harvey Lederman

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 203728

Comment: Theorem 1 generalized to a richer domain of worlds (finite-valued real functions), and strengthened by eliminating an earlier axiom, Additive Invariance. The result no longer uses lotteries, allowing for the combination of two earlier axioms (Dominance, Ex Ante Indifference) into a single one (Quasi-Independence). Various further small changes of terminologyWe study social welfare relations (SWRs) on an infinite population. Our main result is a new characterization of a utilitarian SWR as the \emph{largest} SWR (in terms of subset when the weak relation is viewed as a set of pairs) which satisfies Strong Pareto, Permutation Invariance (elsewhere called ``Relative Anonymity'' and ``Isomorphism Invariance''), and a further ``Quasi-Independence'' axiom.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH