A Generalised $\lambda$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games

• Tác giả: Subhadip Chakrabarti, Robert P Gilles, Lina Mallozzi
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2024
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 203729

Tóm tắt

In this note we develop a generalisation of the $\lambda$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $\lambda$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $\lambda$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.