Uniform price auction with quantity constraints

• Tác giả: Kiho Yoon
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 381.17 Auctions
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2024
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 204037

Tóm tắt

We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds a Nash equilibrium outcome under semi-complete information as well as a novel ascending auction under incomplete information that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is sometimes advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price.