Strategic communication of narratives

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Tác giả: Gerrit Bauch, Manuel Foerster

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 880.923 Literatures of Hellenic languages Classical Greek literature

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

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Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 204698

We conceptualize the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret the data, but aware of the sender's incentives to strategically provide interpretations ("narratives") in her favor. We consider a general class of decision rules under ambiguity resolving the receiver's ignorance of the true data generating process, including maximum likelihood expected utility. The set of equilibria is characterized by a positive integer $N$: there is an equilibrium that induces $n$ different actions for each $1\leq n \leq N$. The diverting power of the sender is weaker than with a na\"ive receiver being unaware of the sender's incentives. Surprisingly, the receiver sometimes prefers to be na\"ive.
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