Bounded Rationality in Central Bank Communication

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Tác giả: Wonseong Kim, Choong Lyol Lee

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.11 Central banks

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 204830

Comment: 72 pages, 5 figures, 8 tablesThis study explores the influence of FOMC sentiment on market expectations, focusing on cognitive differences between experts and non-experts. Using sentiment analysis of FOMC minutes, we integrate these insights into a bounded rationality model to examine the impact on inflation expectations. Results show that experts form more conservative expectations, anticipating FOMC stabilization actions, while non-experts react more directly to inflation concerns. A lead-lag analysis indicates that institutions adjust faster, though the gap with individual investors narrows in the short term. These findings highlight the need for tailored communication strategies to better align public expectations with policy goals.
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