Incentive Design with Spillovers

• Tác giả: Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Anant Shah
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 155.96 Influence of restrictive environments
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2024
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 204917

Tóm tắt

A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and outcomes. Incentive optimality requires equalizing, across agents, a product of (i) individual productivity (ii) organizational centrality and (iii) responsiveness to monetary incentives.