Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models

• Tác giả: Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 511.4 Approximations formerly also 513.24 and expansions
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2024
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 205041

Tóm tắt

This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise stability. We also examine their relationship to established notions in the literature, such as worker-quasi and firm-quasi stability in both many-to-one and many-to-many markets.