Decision making in stochastic extensive form II: Stochastic extensive forms and games

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Tác giả: E. Emanuel Rapsch

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 003.56 Decision theory

Thông tin xuất bản: 2024

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Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 205109

A general theory of stochastic extensive forms is developed to bridge two concepts of information flow: decision trees and refined partitions on the one side, filtrations from probability theory on the other. Instead of the traditional "nature" agent, this framework uses a single lottery draw to select a tree of a given decision forest. Each "personal" agent receives dynamic updates from an own oracle on the lottery outcome and makes partition-refining choices adapted to this information. This theory addresses a key limitation of existing approaches in extensive form theory, which struggle to model continuous-time stochastic processes, such as Brownian motion, as outcomes of "nature" decision making. Additionally, a class of stochastic extensive forms based on time-indexed action paths is constructed, encompassing a wide range of models from the literature and laying the groundwork for an approximation theory for stochastic differential games in extensive form.Comment: 51 pages (76 pages with appendix), second part of a three-paper series, for Part I see arXiv:2404.12332. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2404.12332
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