Mechanism Design in Max-Flows

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Tác giả: Zhigang Cao, Shengyuan Huang, Wenjun Mei, Xiaoguang Yang

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 612.13 Blood vessels and vascular circulation

Thông tin xuất bản: 2025

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 223698

Comment: 23 pages, 9 figures, 1 tableThis paper studies allocation mechanisms in max-flow games with players' capacities as private information. We first show that no core-selection mechanism is truthful: there may exist a player whose payoff increases if she under-reports her capacity when a core-section mechanism is adopted. We then introduce five desirable properties for mechanisms in max-flow games: DSIC (truthful reporting is a dominant strategy), SIR (individual rationality and positive payoff for each player contributing positively to at least one coalition), SP (no edge has an incentive to split into parallel edges), MP (no parallel edges have incentives to merge), and CM (a player's payoff does not decrease as another player's capacity and max-flow increase). While the Shapley value mechanism satisfies DSIC and SIR, it fails to meet SP, MP and CM. We propose a new mechanism based on minimal cuts that satisfies all five properties.
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