Recently, autonomous driving system (ADS) has been widely adopted due to its potential to enhance travel convenience and alleviate traffic congestion, thereby improving the driving experience for consumers and creating lucrative opportunities for manufacturers. With the advancement of data sensing and control technologies, the reliability of ADS and the purchase intentions of consumers are continually evolving, presenting challenges for manufacturers in promotion and pricing decisions. To address this issue, we develop a two-stage game-theoretical model to characterize the decision-making processes of manufacturers and consumers before and after a technology upgrade. Considering the unique structural characteristics of ADS, which consists of driving software and its supporting hardware (SSH), we propose different business strategies for SSH (bundle or unbundle with the vehicle) and driving software (perpetual licensing or subscription) from the manufacturer's perspective. We find that, first, SSH strategies influence the optimal software strategies by changing the consumers' entry barriers to the ADS market. Specifically, for manufacturers with mature ADS technology, the bundle strategy provides consumers with a lower entry barrier by integrating SSH, making the flexible subscription model a dominant strategy
while perpetual licensing outperforms under the unbundle strategy. Second, the software strategies influence the optimal SSH strategy by altering consumers' exit barriers. Perpetual licensing imposes higher exit barriers
when combined with a bundle strategy that lowers entry barriers, it becomes a more advantageous choice for manufacturers with mature ADS technology. In contrast, the subscription strategy allows consumers to easily exit the market, making the bundle strategy advantageous only when a substantial proportion of consumers are compatible with ADS.