Better Policies from Policy-Selective Aid?

• Tác giả: Kurt Annen
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 338.18 Government farm policies
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 228891
• Chủ đề: 1. AID POLICY; 2. COUNTRY POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT; 3. DONOR CONDITIONALITY; 4. GOVERNANCE; 5. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Tóm tắt

This paper shows that the increased policy-selectivity of aid allocations observed in recent years provides recipient countries an incentive to improve policies. The paper estimates that a change in the World Banks Country Policy and Institutional Assessment policy index from 1.5 to 2 for a recipient is associated with an increase of about 13 percent in aid. The analysis also finds a modest but statistically significant positive relationship between the share of policy-selective aid in the global aid budget and policy, suggesting that policy-selective aid improves policies. This effect is properly identified, as the share of policy-selective aid in the global aid budget is exogenous to recipient country policy choices. Furthermore, the paper provides a game theoretic model that establishes the link between the policy-selectivity of the global budget and better recipient country policies in equilibrium.