The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box : Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies

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Tác giả: Masaaki Higashijima

Ngôn ngữ: eng

ISBN-13: 978-0472055319

ISBN-13: 978-0472075317

ISBN-13: 978-0472220083

ISBN-13: mpu-b.11978139

Ký hiệu phân loại: 321.9 *Authoritarian government

Thông tin xuất bản: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2022

Mô tả vật lý: 1 electronic resource (366 p.)

Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở

ID: 241520

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
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