Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians

• Tác giả: Philip Keefer
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 320.2 Political science (Politics and government)
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 244470
• Chủ đề: 1. CLIENT; 2. CREDIBLE COMMITTMENT; 3. ELECTION ADMISNITRATION; 4. POLICITAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS; 5. VOTE BUYING

Tóm tắt

Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society.