High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

• Tác giả: Ajit Mishra
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 003.5 Theory of communication and control
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 244486
• Chủ đề: 1. KNOWING; 2. MOTIVATION; 3. RISK NEUTRAL; 4. TECHNOLOGY; 5. TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY

Tóm tắt

This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communication in the presence of typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.