Does Risk Aversion Affect Transmission and Generation Planning? A Western North America Case Study [electronic resource]

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Tác giả:

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 621.3 Electrical, magnetic, optical, communications, computer engineering; electronics, lighting

Thông tin xuất bản: Washington, D.C. : Oak Ridge, Tenn. : United States. Office of Under Secretary of Energy for Energy and Environment ; Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy, 2017

Mô tả vật lý: Size: p. 213-225 : , digital, PDF file.

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 260530

Here, we investigate the effects of risk aversion on optimal transmission and generation expansion planning in a competitive and complete market. To do so, we formulate a stochastic model that minimizes a weighted average of expected transmission and generation costs and their conditional value at risk (CVaR). We also show that the solution of this optimization problem is equivalent to the solution of a perfectly competitive risk-averse Stackelberg equilibrium, in which a risk-averse transmission planner maximizes welfare after which risk-averse generators maximize profits. Furthermore, this model is then applied to a 240-bus representation of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, in which we examine the impact of risk aversion on levels and spatial patterns of generation and transmission investment. Although the impact of risk aversion remains small at an aggregate level, state-level impacts on generation and transmission investment can be significant, which emphasizes the importance of explicit consideration of risk aversion in planning models.
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