A naïve realist theory of colour

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Tác giả: Keith Allen

Ngôn ngữ: eng

ISBN-10: 0198755368

ISBN-13: 978-0198755364

Ký hiệu phân loại: 121.35 Sensation

Thông tin xuất bản:

Mô tả vật lý: x, 204 pages : , illustrations ; , 24

Bộ sưu tập: Tâm lý, Logic

ID: 280114

A Naive Realist Theory of Colour' defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don't really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued that 'a naive realist theory of colour' best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. 'A Naive Realist Theory of Colour' also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consciousness, the apparent tension between common sense and scientific representations of the world, and even the very nature and possibility of philosophical inquir
Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-197) and inde
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