A Model of the Interactions between Banking Crises and Currency Crises

• Tác giả: Michael Bleaney
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.46 Monetary policy
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 291222
• Chủ đề: 1. Banks; 2. Foreign Exchange F310; 3. International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions F330; 4. Micro Finance Institutions; 5. Other Depository Institutions

Tóm tắt

A second-generation model of currency crises is combined with a standard banking model. In a pegged exchange rate regime, after funds have been committed to the banks, news arrives about the quality of the banks' assets and about the exchange rate fundamentals. A run on the banks may cause a currency crisis, or vice versa. There are multiple equilibria (with either twin crises or no crisis), depending on depositors' expectations of other depositors' actions. Suspension of deposit convertibility can prevent a speculative attack on the currency, but last resort lending to solvent banks can induce one.