Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked

• Tác giả: Mary Shirley
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 330 Economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 291260
• Chủ đề: 1. CONTRACTS; 2. EFFICIENCY; 3. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS; 4. POLITICS; 5. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

Tóm tắt

When privatization is not feasible or palatable, developing country governments seeking to improve the performance of state enterprises are often negotiating performance contracts with their managers. Many of these contracts have been put in place with World Bank assistance. Research shows that they rarely work. The author summarizes the rationale for performance contracts and the evidence against them and explores the reasons why they haven't worked. She concludes that since a well-designed and carefully enforced performance contract can be as politically costly as a well-designed privatization, performance contracts are not likely to be successful in countries that lack the political will to privatize.