Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates

• Tác giả: Franck Lecocq
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 158.5 Negotiation
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 291655
• Chủ đề: 1. ABATEMENT; 2. ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS; 3. ABATEMENT COSTS; 4. ATMOSPHERE; 5. BENCHMARK

Tóm tắt

In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.