Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

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Tác giả: Eliana Carranza

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 331.12 Labor market

Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở

ID: 292725

This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
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