Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

• Tác giả: Eliana Carranza
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 331.12 Labor market
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 292725
• Chủ đề: 1. AFRICA GENDER POLICY; 2. GENDER INNOVATION LAB; 3. LABOR MARKET; 4. LABOR SKILLS; 5. LIMITED INFORMATION

Tóm tắt

This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.