The Logic of the CAP

• Tác giả: Christian H.C.A Henning
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 511.3 Mathematical logic (Symbolic logic)
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2017
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 293535
• Chủ đề: 1. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES; 2. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION; 3. BARGAINING; 4. BARGAINING POWER; 5. CETERIS PARIBUS

Tóm tắt

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.