On the Design of Tariff Policy

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Tác giả: David G Tarr

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 337.2 International economics

Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2017

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở

ID: 294552

 This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure. Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade
  'strategic,' infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the WTO. Arguments in favor of uniformity are: political economy considerations
  administrative convenience
  and reduction of smuggling and corruption in customs. The author maintain that tariff uniformity is the best choice in practice. A uniform tariff conveys a number of advantages, the most important of which is that if the tariff is uniform, the gains to industry lobbying are much smaller (and may be negative), creating a kind of free-rider problem for the lobbying industry and dramatically reduces the incentive to lobby for protection. Then: (1) the level of protection is likely to be lower (the recent experience of Chile is a dramatic case in point)
  (2) there is a direct saving of resources from the reduced lobbying
  (3) the reduction to the gains from lobbying for protection provides a vastly improved signal to valuable entrepreneurial talent which will thus be encouraged to create better and cheaper products
  and (4) the reduction in resources devoted to lobbying will result in less corruption in government, which may have positive spillover effects into other dimensions of government activity.
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