Rebidding for Concessions

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Tác giả: Michael Klein

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 381.17 Auctions

Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở

ID: 295488

The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding.
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