Exiting a Lawless State

• Tác giả: Karla Hoff
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 396.1 [Unassigned]
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 296340
• Chủ đề: 1. ABUSE; 2. ABUSE OF POWER; 3. AGENCY PROBLEMS; 4. ANTICORRUPTION; 5. ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS

Tóm tắt

An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping, and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving.