Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition

• Tác giả: Karla Hoff
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 330 Economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 299763
• Chủ đề: 1. ACCOUNTABILITY; 2. ASSASSINATION; 3. AUTHORITARIANISM; 4. AUTHORITY; 5. BINDING CONSTRAINT

Tóm tắt

The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power.