(Un)bundling Public-Private Partnership Contracts in the Water Sector : Competition in Auctions and Economies of Scale in Operation

• Tác giả: Atsushi Iimi
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 338.92 Specific policies
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 301748
• Chủ đề: 1. ACCESS TO WATER; 2. ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY; 3. COMMUNITY WATER; 4. COMPETITION IN WATER; 5. COMPETITIVE BIDDING

Tóm tắt

In public-private partnership transactions in the water sector, one of the alleged concerns is that there is little market competition at the auction stage. This paper casts light on a tradeoff between the competition effect at the auction level and potential economies of scale in service operation. If the authorities design a large-scale public-private partnership water transaction, it is expected to exploit operational scale economies. But the competition effect may have to be sacrificed. The paper shows a risk that the selection of the contract size could be a very restrictive condition that excludes many prospective bidders. Moreover, the paper quantifies the optimal size of public-private partnership contracts in the sector by estimating a cost function. The analysis shows that economies of scale exist but tend to diminish quickly as production increases. When the amount of water sold exceeds about 40 million