Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity : Survey Evidence from European Firms

• Tác giả: Jan Babecky
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 331.29 Historical, geographic, persons treatment of compensation
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 304420
• Chủ đề: 1. ADVERSE SELECTION; 2. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; 3. BARGAINING AGREEMENT; 4. BARGAINING POWER; 5. BUSINESS CYCLE

Tóm tắt

It has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little, especially downwards, to shocks that hit their employer. This paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms across Europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms. The authors analyse which firm-level and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity. The results indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is consistent with related theoretical models (e.g. efficiency wage theory, insider-outsider theory). The analysis also finds that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment. Collective bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity, measured on the basis of wage indexation. Downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection regulations.