Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption : Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?

• Tác giả: Jose Anson
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 337.2 International economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 305239
• Chủ đề: 1. CORRUPT PRACTICES; 2. CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION; 3. FRAUD; 4. INSPECTIONS; 5. TARIFF POLICY

Tóm tắt

The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia.