Education, Social Norms, and the Marriage Penalty

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Tác giả: Maurizio Bussolo

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 303.37 Social norms

Thông tin xuất bản: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2024

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở

ID: 305289

A growing literature attributes gender inequality in labor market outcomes in part to the reduction in female labor supply after childbirth, the child penalty. However, if social norms constrain married women's activities outside the home, then marriage can independently reduce employment, even in the absence childbearing. Given the correlation in timing between childbirth and marriage, conventional estimates of child penalties will conflate these two effects. The paper studies the marriage penalty in South Asia, a context featuring conservative gender norms and low female labor force participation. The study introduces a split-sample, pseudo-panel approach that allows for the separation of marriage and child penalties even in the absence of individual-level panel data. Marriage reduces women's labor force participation in South Asia by 12 percentage points, whereas the marginal penalty of childbearing is small. Consistent with the central roles of both opportunity costs and social norms, the marriage penalty is smaller among cohorts with higher education and less conservative gender attitudes.
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