How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia

• Tác giả: Milan Vodopivec
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 720.94 Architecture
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 307492
• Chủ đề: 1. Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H230; 2. Personal Finance D140; 3. Redistributive Effects; 4. Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; 5. Unemployment Insurance

Tóm tắt

 Applying a methodology similar to Feldstein and Altman (1998) to Slovenia's unemployment insurance (UI) system, the paper shows that unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) are a viable alternative to a modest, but not generous, UI system. Under the modest regime, only one quarter of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 43% ever experience a negative UISA balance
  in contrast, under the generous regime, 49% of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 66% ever experience a negative balance. The simulations also show that the level of redistribution under UISAs lags behind the redistribution implied by the UI system.