Financial (Dis-)Information : Evidence from an Audit Study in Mexico

• Tác giả: Cristina Martinez Cuellar
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 598.19 Ayes (Birds)
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 309073
• Chủ đề: 1. ACCESS TO SAVINGS; 2. ACCURATE INFORMATION; 3. ACTUAL COSTS; 4. ADVERSE SELECTION; 5. ADVERTISEMENTS

Tóm tắt

An audit study was conducted in peri-urban Mexico to understand the quality of information and products offered to low-income potential customers. Trained auditors visited multiple financial institutions seeking credit and savings products. Consistent with Gabaix and Laibson (2006), staff voluntarily provides little information about avoidable fees, especially to auditors trained to reveal little knowledge about the market. In addition, clients are almost never offered the cheapest product, most likely because staff is incentivized to offer more expensive products that are thus more profitable to the institution. This suggests that disclosure and transparency policies may be ineffective if they undermine the commercial interest of financial institutions.