The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

• Tác giả: Thorsten Beck
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.1 Banks
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 310148
• Chủ đề: 1. ACCOUNTABILITY; 2. ADVERSE SELECTION; 3. AGENTS; 4. APPLICATIONS; 5. AUDITING

Tóm tắt

 Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs
  on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.