When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

• Tác giả: Kaushik Basu
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 330 Economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 310845
• Chủ đề: 1. BRIBE; 2. BRIBERY; 3. BRIBES; 4. COLLUSION; 5. COMPETITIVENESS

Tóm tắt

The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs -- maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing the environmental safeguards required by law -- such that honest players are driven out of the market when the market becomes sufficiently competitive.