Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance

• Tác giả: Luc Laeven
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.1 Banks
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 311571
• Chủ đề: 1. ACCOUNTING; 2. ASSET VALUE; 3. ASSET VALUES; 4. ASSET VOLATILITY; 5. BAILOUT

Tóm tắt

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicates that a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates the cost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14 economies to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks and their corporate governance structure. The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownership engage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, as a proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has some power in predicting bank distress