Centralized Purchasing Arrangements

• Tác giả: Beatriz Arizu
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 352.5 Property administration and related topics
• Thông tin xuất bản: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2023
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 316863
• Chủ đề: 1. ENERGY; 2. ENERGY AND MINING; 3. INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM; 4. POWER SECTOR REFORM; 5. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY; 6. COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION; 7. DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; 8. CONTINGENT LIABILITIES; 9. CONTINGENT LIABILITY; 10. STATE-OWNED UTILITIES; 11. POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT; 12. STATE OWNED COMPANY; 13. ECONOMIES OF SCALE; 14. ENERGY AND WATER; 15. SOVEREIGN GUARANTEE; 16. GENERATION CAPACITY; 17. LACK OF CREDITWORTHINESS; 18. POWER SYSTEM; 19. CENTRALIZED PURCHASING; 20. LEVEL OF PRIVATE; 21. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION; 22. SMALL POWER SYSTEM; 23. COMPETITIVE ENERGY MARKET; 24. PARTIAL RISK GUARANTEE; 25. FEDERAL ELECTRICITY COMMISSION; 26. STATE ELECTRICITY COMPANY; 27. UTILITY REGULATORY POLICY; 28. STATE REGULATORY COMMISSION; 29. INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR; 30. WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICE; 31. STATE POWER UTILITY; 32. WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY TRADE; 33. CHRONIC POWER SHORTAGES; 34. THERMAL POWER PLANT; 35. COST OF CAPITAL; 36. SANCTITY OF CONTRACT; 37. RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACT; 38. POWER SECTOR REGULATION; 39. TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR; 40. HIGH ENERGY PRICE; 41. ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY; 42. COMPETITIVE POWER SECTOR; 43. ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS; 44. PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION; 45. ERRORS OF FACT; 46. SMALL POWER PRODUCER; 47. OIL & GAS; 48. OIL AND GAS; 49. MARKET PENETRATION RATE; 50. NATIONAL POWER UTILITY; 51. RISK OF TRANSMISSION; 52. POWER SYSTEM OPERATION; 53. WHOLESALE ENERGY; 54. WHOLESALE MARKET; 55. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT; 56. CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT; 57. LONG-TERM CONTRACT; 58. PRIVATE POWER; 59. CORRUPTION; 60. DEMAND GROWTH; 61. VARIABLE COST; 62. PAY CLAUSE; 63. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE; 64. GENERATION COST; 65. REFORM EFFORT; 66. GENERATION ASSET; 67. SECTOR STRUCTURE; 68. ENERGY CONTRACTS; 69. DEMAND FORECAST; 70. INCUMBENT UTILITY; 71. POLITICAL PRESSURE; 72. POWER CRISIS; 73. POWER SUPPLY; 74. POWER UTILITIES; 75. TRANSMISSION COMPANY; 76. LOAD FORECAST; 77.

Tóm tắt

By examining the broad range of variations in design and implementation of energy trading models around the world, our evaluation showed that sometimes the pure Single Buyer is actually the only alternative, particularly in distressed power systems. Even under dire circumstances, it is still possible to minimize many of its drawbacks with a careful design at the outset. It is essential to procure energy competitively and build flexible contractual and institutional arrangements that envisage a smooth transition towards a more competitive power sector, when conditions permit. The results of this study also indicate that it is neither necessary nor desirable to grant a de jure monopoly status to a Single Buyer, even at the early stages of power sector reform. Such a monopoly may backfire, by creating future rigidities that will defeat the main objectives of the reform process. Experiences have shown that more often than not, Single Buyer models have resulted in unaffordable prices, lack of transparency, and virtually little or no competition in power generation.