Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure : Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions

• Tác giả: Alexander Moore
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 330 Economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 324066
• Chủ đề: 1. AMOUNT OF DEBT; 2. BAILOUTS; 3. BANK POLICY; 4. BANKRUPT; 5. BANKRUPTCY

Tóm tắt

The paper examines the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. They test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011, finding broad support for our predictions.