Bank Runs and Moral Hazard

• Tác giả: Deniz Anginer
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.1 Banks
• Thông tin xuất bản: World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 325242
• Chủ đề: 1. BANKING CRISIS; 2. BANKING RISK; 3. BANKING SYSTEM; 4. DEPOSIT INSURANCE; 5. MORAL HAZARD

Tóm tắt

Deposit insurance is a widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking sector. Deposit insurance helps ensure depositors' confidence in the financial system and prevents contagious bank runs, but it also comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging banks to take on excessive risk. This paper reviews the economic costs and benefits of deposit insurance and highlights the importance of institutions and specific design features for how well deposit insurance schemes work in practice.