Does Reducing Unemployment Insurance Generosity Reduce Job Match Quality?

• Tác giả: Jan C van Ours
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 331.13 Maladjustments in labor market
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2012
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 325665
• Chủ đề: 1. Labor Contracts J410; 2. Plant Closings J650; 3. Severance Pay; 4. Unemployment Insurance

Tóm tắt

This paper analyzes how a change in Slovenia's unemployment insurance law affected the quality of jobs workers found after periods of unemployment. Taking advantage the "natural experiment" we show through difference-in-differences estimation results that reducing the potential duration of unemployment benefits had no detectable effect on wages, on the probability of securing a permanent rather than a temporary job, or on the duration of the post-unemployment job.