Áp dụng Lý thuyết ủy nhiệm trong nghiên cứu kế toán

Áp dụng Lý thuyết ủy nhiệm trong nghiên cứu kế toán – kiểm toán

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Tác giả: Phúc Sinh Nguyễn

Ngôn ngữ: vie

Ký hiệu phân loại:

Thông tin xuất bản: Tạp chí Kế toán và Kiểm toán, 2023

Mô tả vật lý: tr.27-29

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 341284

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Lý thuyết ủy nhiệm là lý thuyết cốt lõi của những vấn đề phát sinh liên quan đến báo cáo tài chính (BCTC) và được xem là lý thuyết nền tảng trong nhiều nghiên cứu, đặc biệt trong lĩnh vực kế toán – kiểm toán. Lý thuyết này đề cập đến mối quan hệ giữa bên ủy nhiệm (principal) và bên được ủy nhiệm (agent) thông qua hợp đồng và luôn tồn tại những xung đột lợi ích trong các mối quan hệ ủy nhiệm (giữa bên ủy nhiệm và bên được ủy nhiệm). Cả hai bên đều mong muốn tối đa hóa lợi ích của mình. Mặc dù, trách nhiệm của bên được ủy nhiệm là phải hành xử theo hướng tối đa hóa lợi ích của bên ủy nhiệm. Những mong đợi của bên ủy nhiệm có thể làm cho bên được ủy nhiệm có những hành vi làm sai lệch BCTC. Do vậy, với các vấn đề nghiên cứu liên quan đến BCTC như: chất lượng BCTC, thông tin tài chính, lựa chọn chính sách kế toán, nghiên cứu hành vi nhà quản lý hay nghiên cứu về các khía cạnh kiểm toán,... thì lý thuyết ủy nhiệm luôn được nhắc đến và trở thành một trong những lý thuyết nền tảng trong nghiên cứu lĩnh vực kế toán – kiểm toán.The principal-agent theory comprises a crucial theoretical framework for addressing complex issues pertaining to financial reporting, and it serves as a foundational theory widely employed in a variety of research inquiries, particularly in the fields of accounting and auditing. This theory clarifies the complex relationship between the principal, who delegated authority, and the agent, who assumed responsibility, in the context of contractual arrangements, thereby highlighting the inherent conflicts of interest within the agency relationship. Despite the agent's duty to act in the proprietor's best interests, both the principal and the agent seek to maximize their own interests. However, the principal's expectations may induce the agent to engage in opportunistic behaviors that result in inaccurate financial reporting. Consequently, the principal-agent theory is of utmost importance in addressing diverse research concerns associated with financial reporting, such as the quality of financial reports, financial information disclosure, accounting policy choices, examination of managerial behaviors, and investigation of auditing dimensions. As a result, the principal-agent theory has become firmly established as a cornerstone theory in accounting and auditing research.

1. Đọc trực tuyến

1. Đọc trực tuyến

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